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Abstract. In this paper, we study the Dynamic Decisional Diffie-Hellman (3DH)
problem, a powerful generalization of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) prob-
lem. Our main result is that DDH implies 3DH. This result leads to significantly
simpler proofs for protocols by relying directly on the more general problem. Our
second contribution is a computationally sound symbolic technique for reasoning
about protocols that use symmetric encryption and modular exponentiation. We
show how to apply our results in the case of the Burmester & Desmedt protocol.
Keywords:Diffie-Hellman Assumptions, Soundness of Formal Encryption, Prov-
able Security.
Context Key agreement protocols are essential components of many practical applica-
tions (e.g. Kerberos, SSH, TLS, video conferencing), and good design of such protocols
has been subject of much cryptographic research. Starting with the pioneering work for
key agreement is the Diffie-Hellman protocol [DH76], a variety of protocols based on
exponentiation have been proposed. Security of most of these protocols typically relies
on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH). This assumption states that given gx1 , gx2 , it
is difficult to distinguish between gx1x2 and gr, so gx1x2 can be safely used as a shared
key by parties with private keys x1 and x2.
The extensions of protocols from the 2-party setting to the many-party setting seemed
to require stronger assumptions. For instance, a common extension of the DDH prob-
lem is the Group DDH problem (GDDH for short) [STW96,BCP02]. Here, the adver-
sary gets to see several exponentials (for instance in a setting with three principles he
observes gx1 , gx2 , gx3 , gx1x2 , gx1x3 , gx2x3 and has to distinguish between gx1x2x3 and
gr). Nevertheless, most of these extensions were shown to be in fact equivalent to the
standard DDH problem.
Motivation In most group key agreement protocols that use exponentiation, the mes-
sages that are sent by parties (and the key that is agreed upon) are of the form gx1x2...xk ,
that is, g raised to some monomial over the secret keys x1, x2, . . . , xn. However, in a
few protocols, g is raised to powers that are linear combinations of such monomials. For
these protocols carrying out a reduction proof from the DDH assumption seems rather
intricate. A good example of such a protocol is that of Burmester & Desmedt proto-
col [BD94] which has been proved secure only recently [KY03,BD05]. The goal of our
work is to find a general form of the DDH problem that would enable simple reduction
proofs for protocols even when exponents may be linear combinations of monomials.
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Dynamic Decisional Diffie-Hellman We consider a group G of large prime order q and
a generator g of G. We introduce a powerful extension of the DDH problem on G, that
we call the Dynamic Decisional Diffie-Hellman (3DH) assumption. The generalization
is three fold. 1) The exponents used may be polynomials (as opposed to simple mono-
mials), 2) the adversary gets to select what exponents are used and 3) we allow more
than one target exponential that the adversary has to distinguish from a random power.
Consider variables x1 to xα for some α ∈ N . A monomial is a product of distinct
variables and a polynomial is a linear combination of monomials. The 3DH assumption
considers an adversary that can plays one of two different games, and as usual in de-
cisional assumptions, the adversary has to guess against which game he is playing. In
each game the adversary interacts with two oracles. Intuitively, the first oracle outputs
the exponentials that the adversary is allowed to see (e.g. for the particular case that
corresponds to DDH the first oracle outputs gx1 , gx2 ). The second oracle is the chal-
lenge oracle which, depending on the game, outputs either exponentials consistent with
the first oracle, or random powers of g (in the case of DDH it outputs either gx1x2 , or
gr).
A bit more formally, the oracles first sample uniformly and independently at random
values (in Zq) for each of the variables x1 to xα. Then they start to answer queries.
The first oracle is the same in both games. It takes as argument a polynomial P over
(xi)αi=1 and returns g
P (x1,...,xα). The second oracle is as follows. In the first game it
takes as input polynomials Q and returns gQ(x1,...,xα) in the first game, and gr for some
randomly sampled r in Zq in the second game.
We impose several restrictions on the polynomials that the adversary can query.
First, we require that in these polynomials variables do not occur at powers greater than
1. This restriction seems unavoidable since the indistinguishability of gx and gx.x under
the DDH assumption is an open problem [BDZ03]. The second restriction takes care of
trivial attacks. An adversary can first submit a polynomial to the first oracle then submit
it to the second oracle. If the two results are the same, the adversary knows with high
probability that he is in the first game. Otherwise, the adversary knows for sure that
he is in the second game. We require that the polynomials submitted to the oracles are
linearly independent.
Adversaries are polynomial time (in η) Turing machines. We say that the DDH
assumption holds if the probability for any adversary to distinguish (gx, gy, gx.y) from
(gx, gy, gr) is negligible. In a similar way, the 3DH assumption holds if the probability
for any adversary to distinguish the two previous games is negligible. Our main result is
that if the DDH assumption holds, then the 3DH assumption also holds. The reciprocal
is also true but rather easy to prove.
Soundness of Symbolic Equivalence Our second contribution is an extension of the cel-
ebrated result of Abadi and Rogaway [AR00]. This result states that symbolic equiva-
lence implies computational indistinguishability for messages that use symmetric cryp-
tography. We extend their result to the case when messages use symmetric encryption
and modular exponentiation, and exponentials are used as symmetric keys.
As usual, message are represented as algebraic terms as in [DY83]. To the language
in [AR00], we add new expressions of the form exp(p) for any polynomial p. Intuitively,
this expression represents g to the power of p, i.e. gp. Exponentiations can be used as a
21
key or as a standard message, however polynomials can only occur in exponentiations
and cannot be used as messages.
The deduction relation  is an extended version of the classical Dolev-Yao entail-
ment relation [DY83]. Two new deductions are added in order to handle exponentia-
tions:
E  exp(p) E  exp(q)
E  exp(λp+ q) λ ∈   E  exp(1)
We are mainly interested in the soundness of symbolic equivalence as in [AR00,MP05].
Thus as in these papers, we use a pattern function which represents accessible informa-
tion from a message m. Definition of our pattern function is classical except for expo-
nentiation: pattern
(
exp(p)
)
= exp(p). We say that two messages are equivalent if
they have the same pattern. Two messages are equivalent up to renaming if they are
equivalent up to some renaming of keys, nonces and polynomial.
m ∼= n if and only if ∃σ1 a permutation of Keys
∃σ2 a permutation of Nonces
∃σ3 a linear dependence preserving bijection of polynomials
such that m ≡ nσ1σ2σ3
Renaming of key was already used in [AR00]. Renaming of nonces works in the same
way. However renaming of polynomials is more subtle: let us consider message (exp(x),
exp(y), exp(x+y)), if this message is simply transformed into (exp(x), exp(y), exp(z)),
then instantiations of these two messages are easy to distinguish in the computational
setting. In the first case, the third element is the product of the two first ones where as
in the second case, this is only the case with negligible probability. In order to fix this
problem, we only consider linear dependence preserving bijections or ldp bijections.
Such bijections have to preserve linear equations among polynomials which are expo-
nentiated. Let us formalize this. Let σ be a bijection from poly(n) to poly(m). Then σ
is said to be ldp if the exact same equations are satisfied after applying it:
∀p1...pn ∈ poly(n), ∀a1, ..., an, b ∈ Z,
n∑
i=1
ai.pi = b ⇔
n∑
i=1
ai.piσ = b
Equivalence up to renaming is decidable. Let us give some examples of equivalent
messages:
(
exp(x1), exp(x2), exp(x1 + x2)
) ∼= ( exp(x1x2 − x2), exp(x2), exp(x1x2)
)
Linear relations between exponents are not hidden by modular exponentiation. In this
case, the third element is linked to the two previous ones. Hence the same relation must
hold on both side: the exponent of the third term is the sum of the exponents of the two
first terms.
(
exp(x1), exp(x2), {0}exp(x1x2)
) ∼= ( exp(x1), exp(x2), {1}exp(x1x2)
)
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This example illustrates a passive adversary which observes a Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol. Two exponentiations are exchanged that allow the two participants to
build a shared secret key.
We prove computational soundness of this equivalence relation. Letm and n be two
acyclic messages (for an adapted key-acyclicity notion) such that m and n are equiv-
alent up to renaming. If the symmetric encryption used to concretize these messages
is IND-CPA secure and the DDH assumption holds in G, then the computational dis-
tributions of m and n are indistinguishable (i.e. the probability for any adversary to
distinguish them is negligible).
Some related work Our contribution to sound symbolic analysis is part of a recent trend
in bridging the gap which separates the symbolic and computational views of cryptog-
raphy. There have been several extensions to the initial results of Abadi and Rogaway
mostly concerned with adding different cryptographic primitives and supporting active
adversaries. However only a few of the prior results consider modular exponentiation
and none of them consider polynomials in exponents. Some of the relevant papers are as
follows. In [GS05], a logic is used to verify protocols that use modular exponentiation
and digital signature. However only two-party protocols are handled. J. Herzog presents
in [Her04] an abstract model for DH key exchange protocols. While in this work the
adversary is extended with the capability of applying arbitrary polytime functions, we
stick to a more classical symbolic model in the style of [CKRT03,MS03].
The Burmester-Desmedt Protocol Our soundness result can be used to prove security
for the Burmester-Desmedt protocol in the passive setting. This protocol aims at estab-
lishing a secret key between members U1 to Un of a group and is only designed to be
secure against passive adversaries as no authentication is provided.
The protocol uses two rounds: in the first one, each participant Ui samples a random
xi in Zq, and broadcasts Zi = gxi . In the second round, each participant Ui broadcasts
Xi = (Zi+1/Zi−1)xi , where Zn+1 is defined as Z1 and Z0 as Zn. Finally, the shared
key is
Ki = Znxii−1 ·Xn−1i ·Xn−2i+1 · · ·Xi−2 = g
Pn
i=1 xixi+1 .
Let us consider a message M that represents the execution of the protocol and N
be the same message where the shared key is replaced by a random group element gr:
M =
“
exp(x1), · · · , exp(xn), exp(x2x1 − xnx1), · · · , exp(x1xn − xn−1xn), exp(
nX
i=1
xixi+1)
”
N =
“
exp(x1), · · · , exp(xn), exp(x2x1 − xnx1), · · · , exp(x1xn − xn−1xn), exp(r)
”
Messages M and N are equivalent up to renaming and are acyclic. Hence using our
soundness result, the two bit-string distributions are computationally indistinguishable
and thus the shared key cannot be distinguished from a random key after execution of
the protocol.
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